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Case Note
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION:
PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS-RACE AS AN
ADMISSIONS CRITERION
Bakke v. Regents of University of California,
18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The variety and intensity of the social, political, and emotional
arguments involved in the discussion of preferential admissions
programs in general, and Bakke v. Regents of University of CaliforniaI
in particular, tend to obfuscate the true nature of the legal issues facing
the Supreme Court this term. From a social perspective, the Court
faces a very real dilemma. To declare the preferential admissions
programs of public professional schools unconstitutional may mean
that any substantial integration of the medical and legal professions
will be delayed for an indeterminate length of time; to uphold the use
of such programs may mean that the state can deny a graduate education to an individual because of the color of his or her skin. Either of
these results will be disturbing to a large segment of the public.
Nevertheless, the Court has an opportunity to elucidate what is
presently a very confused area of the law by making plain its method of
equal protection analysis. A decision in the Bakke case can, and
should, explain what kind of racial preference, if any, is permissible
and when it can be utilized. The Court will also have to enunciate the
applicable standard of equal protection review to be used in cases of
racial preference. Although the Court has not been inclined to articulate precisely which standard it is using, there is evidence that new
standards besides the traditional tests of "rational basis" and "compelling interest" are evolving. 2 The purpose of this Note is to state the
legal issues the Court faces in the impending Bakke decision, to
1. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S.
1090 (1977).

2. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward:In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1972); but see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,210 & n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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analyze the few lower court decisions which have dealt expressly with
preferential admissions programs, and to suggest an appropriate standard of review to determine the validity of racial preference admission
programs challenged under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3

II.

BAKKE V. REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Allan Bakke applied for admission to the University of California's
medical school at Davis in both 1973 and 1974. In each of those years
there were 100 places available: 16 were reserved for minority candidates selected by a special admissions program, while the other 84
places were filled through the normal admissions process. 4 Bakke
alleged that the candidates selected under the preference plan were less
qualified than himself since the normal admissions process would have
excluded some of them automatically on the basis of grades and test
scores. Therefore, he sought mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory
relief.
The trial court agreed that the special program was unconstitutional, but refused to order the university to admit Bakke. The court
reasoned that Bakke had not proved he would have been admitted but
for the program. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial
court as to the unconstitutionality of the program, and remanded the5
case for a determination of whether Bakke would have been admitted.
The court held it was error for the trial court to place the burden of
proof on Bakke. Since Bakke had established racial discrimination by
the university, the burden regarding nonadmission had shifted to the
university.
The issue addressed by the majority was "whether a racial classification which is intended to assist minorities, but which also has the
effect of depriving those who are not so classified of benefits they
would enjoy but for their race, violate[d] the constitutional rights of the
majority." ' 6 The court dismissed any presumption of a per se
violation based on the use of a racial classification, recognizing that
racial classifications have been upheld in numerous contexts. 7 Howev3. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Justice Mosk provided a detailed explanation of each program. See 18 Cal. 3d at
39-44, 553 P.2d at 1156-59, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684-87.

5. Id. at 63-64, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The Supreme Court,
pending its disposition of the case, stayed the execution of the California Supreme

Court's mandate. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 429 U.S. 953 (1976).
6. 18 Cal. 3d at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
7. Id. at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
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er, unlike remedial plans in school desegregation cases where racial
classifications are judicially mandated, in Bakke there was no prior
intentional discrimination by the university . Another distinguishing
factor the court noted was that no complete deprivation of educational
benefits occurs when children are bussed, whereas a person such as
Bakke suffers an absolute deprivation of a benefit when he is denied a
place in a professional school. 9
The California Supreme Court found that the program violated the
equal protection clause unless the university could show a "compelling interest," ' l rejecting the university's arguments that a less stringent standard should apply. The court chose the strict standard of
review because it felt that no adequate justification had been or could
be made to demonstrate that discrimination by the majority against
itself was not as invidious as discrimination by the majority against a
minority group." Moreover, the opinion cited McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail TransportationCo. 2 for the proposition that the United States
Supreme Court is presently reluctant to apply different standards when
determining the rights of minority and majority group members. 13 The
majority recognized that the McDonald Court held that the standards
of both Title VII14 and section 198115 of the Civil Rights Act prohibit
discrimination against whites as well as non-whites. 16 Although the
majority assumed arguendo the compelling nature of the university's
aims-to integrate the student body and to improve medical care for
minorities 17-it
remained unconvinced that preferential admission
8. Id. at 59, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
9. Id. at 46-47, 553 P.2d at 1160-61, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89. The same argument
was propounded by Justice Douglas dissenting in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
366 n.18 (1974).
10. 18 Cal. 3d at 49-50, 553 P.2d at 1162-63, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91. Noteworthy, is
dicta to the contrary in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d
537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976): "[P]etitioner urges us to apply the strict scrutiny test in
reverse discrimination cases. This we may not do." Id. at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 87.
11. 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 553 P.2d at 1163-64, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
12. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
13. 18 Cal. 3d at 48, 553 P.2d at 1161-62, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970).
15.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
16. 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 553 P.2d at 1164, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692. The majority questioned
the court's ability to reach this result in spite of language in the statute that minorities
should enjoy the same rights as "white citizens." Id. (emphasis in original).
17. The university argued that enrollment of a substantial number of minority
students would further the university's goals because these students would provide
diversity in the class and influence students and members of the profession to become
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policies based on race were necessary to achieve such goals.
The university analogized its preferential program to those found in
the employment area, but the majority of the court distinguished
employment cases as it had the school cases, because minority preference in employment was a remedial measure in light of past discrimination. 19 Although the proposition was offered by amici curiae that the
use of standardized tests by the university was a discriminatory act, the
record revealed no past discrimination on the part of the university,
and the university did not assert that its plan was remedial. The court
also cited Washington v. Davis20 to further support the argument that
the use of standardized tests having a disproportionate racial impact
does not, by itself, comprise a constitutional violation. 2' The Supreme
Court in Davis held that proof of discriminatory purpose is necessary
when a denial of equal protection is alleged. 2 2 Standing alone, underrepresentation of minorities in the medical school, which may be partially
caused by low test scores, would not be sufficient to prove past
discrimination; without proof of discriminatory intent-creating a situation requiring remedial racial preferences-the court found the analogy to Title VII equal employment cases incomplete.

more aware of minority needs in the community. Moreover, they would provide role
models for other minorities. Because of greater rapport with minority community members, minority doctors would have greater interest in serving the special needs of the
minority community. 18 Cal. 3d at 52-53, 553 P.2d at 1164-65, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93.
18. Id. at 53-54, 553 P.2d at 1165-66, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693-94. The university failed

to prove that less onerous alternatives did not exist. The majority also distinguished
other preferential programs because there was no past discrimination warranting a
remedy, no prior judicial authority for a voluntary program, and no assurance that the
divisive effects of such programs on society would be outweighed by the compensatory

relief the programs offered to minorities. Id. at 57-62, 553 P.2d at 1168-71, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 695-99.
19. Id. at 57-59, 553 P.2d at 1168-69, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
20. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
21. 18 Cal. 3d at 60, 553 P.2d at 1169-70, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
22. The Court did not limit discriminatory purpose to explicit expression of such a

purpose on the face of the statute; nor did it discount the relevance of discriminatory
impact in determining discriminatory purpose. An invidious purpose could be shown if a
statute was given discriminatory application, or if intent could be shown from the totality
of relevant facts. 426 U.S. at 239-45. The requirement of discriminatory purpose was
clarified in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). Addressing the interrelationship between purpose and impact, the Court in

Arlington Heights suggested six evidentiary sources for measuring the discriminatory
intent behind official action: (1) the impact of official action, (2) the historical background of a decision (a series of official actions), (3) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision, (4) departures from the normal procedural se-

quence, (5) substantive departures (factors usually considered important strongly favor a
decision contrary to the one reached), and (6) legislative or administrative history. 429
U.S. at 266-68.
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The court offered three racially neutral means by which the university could increase its minority enrollment which demonstrated that
the university had not used "the least intrusive or even the most
effective means to achieve [its] goal." 23 It suggested that the university could be assured of more qualified minority applicants through a
combination of flexible admission standards based on nonquantitative
24
criteria, aggressive recruitment, and an increased number of places.
Even though the motives behind the university's policy might be
socially worthy, the balance could not be struck in favor of the racial
criteria. The court feared that an admissions program using racial
criteria would be socially counterproductive, as well as a dangerous
precedent. 25 Another defect in the special program was its similarity to
historically suspect quota systems.2 6 The majority of the Supreme
Court of California therefore concluded that:
To uphold the University would call for the sacrifice of principle for the sake of dubious expediency and would represent
a retreat in the struggle to assure that each man and woman
shall be judged on the basis of individual merit alone, a
struggle which has only lately achieved success in removing
legal barriers to racial equality.27
Thus, in the majority's estimation, the safest and most constitutionally
was to deny judicial sanction to the special
sound course of action
28
admissions program.
Justice Tobriner was the lone dissenter. He felt that the university's
special admissions program furthered the legitimate constitutional purpose of promoting integration. He found it ironic that the first admissions program "aimed at promoting diversity ever to be struck down
under the Fourteenth Amendment [was] the program most consonant
29
with the underlying purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Justice Tobriner refuted the majority's position on two levels.
First, he asserted that the majority used the wrong standard of review
by erroneously equating the university's classifications with traditional
racial classifications. In doing so, the majority failed "to distinguish
23.

18 Cal. 3d at 57, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695.

24. Id. at 55-56, 553 P.2d at 1166-67, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694-95. The California
Supreme Court left open the possibility that special consideration could still be given to
the "disadvantaged" in a racially neutral way. The court, however, did not define
disadvantaged. 18 Cal. 3d at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
25. Id. at 61, 553 P.2d at 1171, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
26. Id. at 62-63, 553 P.2d at 1171-72, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
27. Id. at 62-63, 553 P.2d at 1171, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
28. Id. at 63, 553 P.2d at 1171-72, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
29. Id. at 66, 553 P.2d at 1174, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
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between invidious racialclassifications and remedial or 'benign' racial classifications.",30 Secondly, he faulted the majority for its determination that the minority students were less qualified than the rejected
nonminority students; he felt that the majority had overemphasized the
importance of the standardized criteria. Because school officials have
discretion to determine admission criteria, Justice Tobriner reasoned
that the departure
from strictly objective criteria was a permissible
31
choice.
policy
Elaborating on his first criticism, Justice Tobriner initially found
that the majority had not cited any authority that required the same
standard of review for both benign and invidious racial classifications.
32
He distinguished McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail TransportationCo. ,
which the majority had used 33 to demonstrate the Supreme Court's
present tendency to evaluate discrimination in the same manner for
both blacks and whites. 34 Justice Tobriner pointed out that in
McDonald, Justice Marshall pointedly refrained from ruling on the
permissibility of affirmative action programs, "whether judicially required or otherwiseprompted." 35 He also distinguished the majority's
use of Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,36 reading Swann not as requiring a "constitutional obligation to desegregate" before racial classifications could be instituted, but rather as
allowing the voluntary use of racial classifications to promote integration. The use of such classifications would be totally consistent with
the broad discretionary powers that school authorities
possess "to
37
society."
pluralistic
a
in
live
to
students
prepare
The majority insisted that all prior benign classifications could be
distinguished because no absolute deprivation was imposed upon the
majority class, or because racial classifications were used remedially,
30. Id. at 65, 553 P.2d at 1173, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (emphasis in original).
31. Justice Tobriner compared the Davis program with the preference granted by
many universities to athletes and relatives of alumni. Id. at 66, 553 P.2d at 1174, 132 Cal.

Rptr. at 702. It must be kept in mind that the admission program in question allowed all
who considered themselves economically or educationally disadvantaged to be reviewed
under the special program. However, no nonminority had been accepted under the

program during the five years since its inception in 1969. Id. at 40-41, 553 P.2d at
1156-57, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684-85.
32. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).

33. 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 553 P.2d at 1164, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
34. Id. at 69 n.3, 553 P.2d at 1176 n.3, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 704 n.3.

35. 427 U.S. at 281 n.8 (emphasis added).
36. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
37. 18 Cal. 3d at 70, 55 P.2d at 1177, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
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in response to instances of past discrimination. Justice Tobriner answered the deprivation argument with an analogy to the employment
area. If nonminorities are not hired, and minorities are hired in their
place, one could say that "but for their race" one or more of the
nonminorities would have been hired. Yet the federal courts have
consistently upheld such programs to the "detriment" of the majority. 38 In a society of limited resources, rectifying past inequities to
minorities will of necessity result in some deprivation to
39
nonminorities.
Justice Tobriner also considered erroneous the assertion that past
discrimination is a requisite element of a valid racial preference
scheme. 40 The special program was voluntarily designed to overcome
the effects of past discrimination in this country. Moreover, remedial
court orders had been issued in Title VII cases to rectify "an objective
condition of minority underrepresentation that is not satisfactorily
justified by an employer. ,41 Justice Tobriner reasoned that if Congress
could statutorily mandate remedial action for such discrimination, the
medical school should be able to overcome its substantial minority
underrepresentation as well.4 2 He therefore concluded that to insist on
strict scrutiny for benign racial classifications was not supported by
logic or by case law, and was contrary to the history and purpose of the
fourteenth amendment.4 3 He would replace the strict scrutiny test with
a less rigid test, yet one more stringent than the rational basis test.
Under this alternative test, a benign classification could be upheld if it
were "directly and reasonably related to the attainment of integration." 4 Justice Tobriner found that this intermediate constitutional
test, if applied, would be satisfied in Bakke. First, objective academic
criteria did not provide an equitable basis for comparing minority and
38. Id. at 73, 553 P.2d at 1179, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 707. See, e.g., Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Wood, Wire
and Metal Lath. Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973);
Southern I11.
Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
39. 18 Cal. 3d at 75, 553 P.2d at 1180, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 76, 553 P.2d at 1181, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
42. Id. at 76-77, 553 P.2d at 1181, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
43. Id. at 78-80, 553 P.2d at 1182-83, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11. A second level of
argument was based on refuting the majority's assumption that the minority candidates
accepted were less than fully qualified. By showing that the minority students were in
fact qualified, Justice Tobriner argued that the use of racial classifications was a
reasonable attempt to promote integration. Id. at 82, 553 P.2d at 1184-85, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 712-13.
44. Id. at 81, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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nonminority students.'a Thus, to overcome the cultural biases built
into traditional academic admission criteria, the university extended
deferential treatment to minorities. 46 Second, minority background
was determined to be a relevant admission criterion because it helped
to promote a diverse student body. Admissions on this basis would
serve the medical profession and ultimately benefit society as a whole.
Since the medical school's objectives could be met "reasonably
and directly" by using race as a criterion, a presumption of unconstitutionality was erroneous. Consequently, the burden placed upon the
school officials to prove that alternatives were nonexistent was also
erroneous. Justice Tobriner felt that the majority of the court should
have accepted the statement of the faculty that the "special admissions
program [was] the only method whereby the school [could] produce a
diverse student body which [would] include qualified students from
disadvantaged backgrounds." 47 Finally, Justice Tobriner dismissed as
disingenuous. and impractical the alternatives the majority had set
forth; to think that any one of them was feasible, or capable of
achieving the goals of the admissions program was unrealistic. 48 He
found it anomolous that the fourteenth amendment could be used to
compel integration of primary and secondary schools, yet, could be
used to bar graduate schools from achieving the same objective.4 9
III.

TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION

Minimum and strict scrutiny 50 are the two traditional methods of
reviewing equal protection challenges to government classifications,
such as the California admissions program. Originally, minimum
45. Justice Tobriner noted the results of empirical studies suggesting little correla-

tion between academic credentials and excellence in the medical profession. He cited
several characteristics of the "successful" doctor, such as "energy, compassion, em-

pathy, dedication, [and] dexterity"-which are all incapable of quantification. Id. at 84,
553 P.2d at 1186, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 714.

46. This point in the dissent was unfortunate, as it clearly, if not intentionally,
misconceived the majority position. The majority emphasized that the university could
make use of any subjective criteria which were not racial. Id. at 54-55,553 P.2d at 1166,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
47. Id. at 89, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (emphasis in original).
48. The majority suggested that nonracial means be used to achieve the same goals,
such as a program for the "disadvantaged." However, Justice Tobriner argued the goal

was an ethnically and racially integrated student body, not simply an economically
diverse one. Id. at 89-90, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718.

49. Id. at 92, 553 P.2d at 1191, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
50. Professor Gunther refers to these as the "old" and the "new" equal protection.

Gunther, supra note 2, at 8.
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scrutiny alone was used in judicial review, requiring only a "rational
relationship" between the challenged classification and a permissible
governmental purpose.5 1 The judiciary deferred almost completely to
the legislature.52 However, it was soon recognized that certain "suspect" classifications affecting "fundamental interests" required much
more exacting justification. The resulting strict scrutiny of those classifications led to considerable judicial intervention. 53 This two-tiered
system became increasingly inflexible, leading commentators to remark upon "the marked contrast between aggressive 'new'equal
protection, with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact
[and] the deferential 'old' equal protection. . . with minimal scrutiny
54
in theory and virtually none in fact."
Briefly, to pass the minimum scrutiny test a classification must be
"reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." 55 However, this formulation proved so permissive that the
equal protection clause was largely powerless to constrain legislative
classifications; to withstand scrutiny, the challenged statute had to be
shown to have merely a rational relationship to its stated objectives.56
In fact, some legislation survived even though the statutory purpose
was unclear. 57 In such cases, the state statute would be sustained so
long as the Court could conceive of some justification for the classifi58
cation made.
More rigorous or "strict" scrutiny is appropriate when the classification in question is racial, or is related to a fundamental personal
51. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-78

(1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
52. See 18 Cal. 3d at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
53. Id.
54. Gunther, supra note 2, at 8 (footnote omitted).
55. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
56. See McDonald v. Board of Elections Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
57. Developments, supra note 51, at 1078-81.
58. The extent of judicial deference under minimum scrutiny is evidenced by an
early statement of Chief Justice Warren:
[T]he States [are permitted] a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which
affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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interest.5 9 In reviewing legislation or other means of state action, when
either a suspect class or a fundamental interest is involved, strict
scrutiny requires the state to show that the classification serves a
compelling interest, and that no alternative methods are available to
achieve the same ends. 60 These requirements have severely limited
legislative racial classifications. When applying strict scrutiny, courts
refuse to speculate in order to discover a rationale for the classificathe
tion; 6 1 furthermore, a statute will not be upheld unless it provides
62
purpose.
its
achieving
and
implementing
for
means
necessary
Professor Gunther has suggested that, despite the continued articulation of a rigid two-tiered analysis, a "newer" equal protection is
evolving. 63 Gunther described this "newer" method of analysis as
"equal protection bite without 'strict scrutiny.' "'6The predominant
characteristic of this middle-level standard is that it is a "meansfocused, relatively narrow. . . ground of decision" within which the
Court must consider seriously whether the "legislative means . . .
substantially further legislative ends." 65 The Justices would no longer
resort "to rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing" 66 but would assess only the reasonableness of the means in
question. 67 In short, this new standard would "close the wide gap
between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the minimal
59. The fundamental interests recognized by the Supreme Court have not been
limited to those expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. Others that have been in-

cluded are the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the
right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and the right to

criminal appeals, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Burger Court has generally
refused to continue expanding the list. Where welfare benefits, Dandridge v. Williams,

397 U.S. 471 (1970), housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), and education, San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), were asserted to be

fundamental rights, the Court has not required strict scrutiny. An attempt to include
wealth as a suspect classification has also failed, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
60. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
61. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cohen, 417 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
62. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
63. See Gunther, supra note 2, at 17-24.
64. Id. at 12.

65. Id. at 20.
66. Id. at 21.
67. The impact of this model on future judicial scrutiny would be significant. First, it
would be solely a "means" analysis. The "ends" analysis of strict scrutiny requiring a
compelling state interest would be eliminated. Second, it would not require that state

purposes be subject to a critical examination of their relative merits, thereby permitting a
broad range of state objectives which would not be subject to the personal value

judgments of individual members of the Court. Finally, the states' ability to choose
appropriate means would be far less limited than under the strict equal protection
standard. The means chosen would not have to be the only alternative available. As long
as the proposed means furthered substantially the legislative purpose, the statute would

be constitutional. Id.
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scrutiny of the old, not by abandoning the strict but by raising the level
of the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.' 68
However, Professor Gunther noted that this newer equal protection
analysis would not preempt the strict scrutiny standard when the
inquiry concerned either suspect classifications or fundamental interests. For example, where a racial classification was at issue, the state
would still be required to show that that classification was the least
onerous means necessary to achieve a compelling end.69
It should be noted that Professor Gunther is not alone in advocating
the recognition of more flexible standards of review in equal protection
cases. Justice Marshall has called for the implementation of a slidingscale balancing test which would accommodate competing governmental and individual interests. 70 In addition, dissenting in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,7 he suggested that
the Court had already applied a spectrum of standards in equal protection cases. "This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the
degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidious72
ness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn."
The majority of the Court, however, has remained steadfast in its
73
refusal to adopt expressly a middle-level equal protection analysis.
The method of analysis articulated by the Court remains two-tiered.
IV.

THE PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS CASES

In addition to the famous case of DeFunis v. Odegaard,7n at least
two other cases 75 have dealt with the issue now faced by the Supreme
68. Id. at 24.
69. Id.
70. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

71. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 99 (emphasis added). This is also the tenor of Justice Powell's remarks in
his concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976). He not only recognized that a newer standard is being invoked by the Court, but also identified the
situations where it is applied.
[O]ur decision today will be viewed by some as a "middle-tier" approach.
While I would not endorse that characteristic and would not welcome a further
subdividing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recognition that
the relatively deferential "rational basis" standard of review normally applied
takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification. So
much is clear from our recent cases.
Id. at 211 n.*.
73. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
74. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
75. Hupart v. Board of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Alevy v.
Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
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Court in Bakke. The opinions in these cases, and that of the Supreme
Court of California in Bakke, do not reach a consensus, however, on
which equal protection standard is appropriate in reviewing constitutional challenges to preferential admissions programs.
In Hupart v. Board of HigherEducation,76 a plaintiff class of male
Caucasians alleged that they were improperly denied admission to the
Biomedical Program of the Center for Biomedical Education of the
City College of New York for the academic year 1974. They accused
the defendants of discriminating against both Caucasians and Asians
through the use of a predetermined quota system for Blacks and
77
Hispanics.
The district court determined that of the 260 applicants the admission committee was considering, 94 had been given tentative acceptances (had been put in the "Yes" category), and another 84 to 100
had been tentatively put in one of two "Hold" categories. 78 A subcommittee decided to offer admission to only 79 of the "Yes" candidates. Of the 15 "Yes" candidates excluded by the subcommittee,
none were Black or Hispanic. When not all 79 offerees accepted,
candidates were chosen from a list of alternates solely on the basis of
race, in proportion to the number of refusals within each of four racial
79
categories.
The court found these practices to be overt, invidious racial discrimination. At first it was thought that, like the University of California, the New York Board had deliberately adopted a policy of minority
preference to fulfill the goals of integration and improved medical
service in urban areas.80 But, as the case developed, it became clear
that the committee's use of race as the sole basis for making many of
the selections was guided by an unwritten and unapproved 50 percent
quota for Blacks and Hispanics, leaving Caucasians, Asians, and
others in the remaining 50 percent. The College, the State of New
York, and the Board's own policy all forbade the use of race as an
admissions standard under any circumstances, even in a program
which sought to encourage young people to pursue a career in urban
medicine.
The facts of Hupart, then, only demonstrated unauthorized racial
76. 420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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discrimination by an agent of the state."' The need for the court to be
specific about its equal protection standard was therefore eliminated:
Whatever standard of scrutiny is ultimately fashioned in "reverse discrimination" cases, it is clear that the State cannot
justify making distinctions on the basis of race without having
first made a deliberate choice to do so. . . . [The court then
left open the question of whether discrimination by the State
based on race could ever be justified.]
While perhaps not every classification by race is "odious," every distinction made on a racial basis is at least
suspect and must be justified. . . . It is not for the court to
supply a rational or compelling basis (or something
in be82
tween) to sustain the questioned state action.
The clear message of the district court opinion in Hupart is that
racial classifications must always be justified, and the state must
provide that justification. The state must have arrived at its racial
preference through a process of deliberate and conscious choice, or it
will fail to meet even a rational basis test. It is also noteworthy that the
court refused to speculate as to the possible justifications for the
classification. Such an attitude is close to Professor Gunther's "newer" equal protection-rational basis "with bite.''83
The second recent case from the state of New York is Alevy v.
Downstate Medical Center.84 The plaintiff, a white male who applied
for admission to the medical center, was placed on the waiting list, but
was eventually denied admission. He alleged that the defendant had
"arbitrarily granted preferential treatment" to minority applicants. 85
The medical center responded by admitting that its admission program
was designed to be "responsive to the medical needs of the community's large black and Puerto Rican population.' 86 The center sought to
achieve this goal by considering all relevant factors, including race,
and financial and educational disadvantages. The center maintained
that due to the large number of applicants, factors readily discerned
through the interviewing process were given more weight than actual
87
quantitative factors.
81. The court noted that the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund had
obtained leave to participate as amicus in the case, but withdrew when these facts

became apparent. Id. at 1105 n.40.
82. Id. at 1106.
83. See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
84. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
85. Id. at 328, 348 N.E.2d at 540, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 330, 348 N.E.2d at 540, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 86. The court noted:
Dr. Parnell conceded that petitioner's screening code was above the average
score of the accepted minority applicants, and that had petitioner been a
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The court applied the test of racial neutrality espoused by Justice
Douglas in his dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard.88 The court then
concluded that the program was neutral, since the admissions decisions were based not on race, but on factors of financial and educational disadvantage. In the alternative, the court found that even if the
minority students had not been admitted, the plaintiff was number 154
in priority for admission, and thus would not have been admitted in
any event. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision
without opinion.8 9 The court of appeals also affirmed the decision on
the basis that Alevy had "failed to demonstrate that he, personally,
suffered any legal harm as a result of respondent's student selection
process."9
In dicta, the court indicated how it would have decided had it been
necessary to apply the equal protection clause to instances of "reverse
discrimination." Judge Gabrielli reviewed the rigidity of the twotiered equal protection approach, and noted that the more recent
Supreme Court cases seem to strike a middle ground, at least in terms
of result. 9 1 He then discussed the appropriate standard to apply when
faced with "benign" discrimination:
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to guarantee
equality for Blacks, and by logical extension has come to
include all minority groups . . . . It would indeed be ironic
and, of course, would cut against the very grain of the amendment, were the equal protection clause used to strike down
measures designed to achieve real equality for persons whom
it was intended to aid. We reject, therefore, the strict scrutiny
test for benign discriminations as, in our view, such an application would be contrary to the salutary purposes for which
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended.92
minority group member he probably would have been accepted. He explained,
however, that due to the large number of applicants, qualitative [sic] achieve-

ment formed but a part of the committee's consideration and that factors
concerning the individual, as revealed in his interview, were far more important
in the selection process.
Id. at 330, 348 N.E.2d at 541,384 N.Y.S.2d at 86. The court probably intended to use the
word "quantitative" not "qualitative" to describe the type of achievement measured by
the screening code since the code score is the aggregate of an applicant's undergraduate
grade point average multiplied by 20, and his average MCAT score multiplied by .05,
adding one point if the applicant is a resident of New York. Id. at 329 n.3, 348 N.E.2d at
540 n.3, 384 N.Y.S.2d .': 84 n.3.
88. 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974).
89. 39 N.Y.2d at 331, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
90. Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
91. The judge cited cases such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and James v.

Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), in support of this proposition. 39 N.Y.2d at 334, 348
N.E.2d at 544, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
92. 39 N.Y.2d at 334-35, 348 N.E.2d at 544-45, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
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The rational basis test was rejected by the New York court as well
because "[g]ranting preferential treatment to some racial groups encourages polarization of the races," and perpetuates "undesirable
93
perceptions of race as criteria."
The court decided upon a middle-level analysis, requiring a "substantial state interest" to justify preferential treatment. At minimum
the interest must be articulated and legitimate, but it need not be
"urgent, paramount or compelling." 94 Rather, courts should uphold a
preferential policy which, on balance, is more beneficial than detrimental. A further inquiry should then be made, according to the Alevy
court, to determine if the state's policy could be accomplished by a
"less objectionable" alternative: "In sum, in proper circumstances,
reverse discrimination is constitutional. However, to be so, it must be
shown that a substantial interest underlies the policy and practice and,
further, that no nonracial, or less objectionable racial, classifications
95
will serve the same purpose."
Perhaps the most well-known preferential admission case is DeFunis v. Odegaard.9 6 The Supreme Court of Washington found the
preferential admissions program used by the University of Washington
Law School to be constitutionally valid. The court found that for
nonminority students the predicted first year average computation
(PFYA) was heavily weighed in the admissions process, but it was not
a major consideration for the minority students. The school had no
fixed quota system; instead it sought a "reasonable" representation of
minority groups in the school. It was clear, however, that the PFYA's
of some minority students would have caused their summary rejection
had they been white. 97 From the facts, three issues arose: (1) Whether
race can ever be considered as a factor in admissions; (2) if the use of
race can be sanctioned, what is the correct standard of review; and (3)
when the standard is applied, does the admissions program pass con98
stitutional muster?
The court found that the use of race is not a per se violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 99 The court relied heavily on the school desegregation cases which not only proscribed segregated school sys93. Id. at 335, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
94. Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
95. Id. at 336-37, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
96. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
97. Id. at 22-23, 507 P.2d at 1174.
98. Id. at 25, 507 P.2d at 1178.
99. Id. at 31, 507 P.2d at 1181.
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tems, but placed affirmative duties on school officials to use race when
necessary to achieve the goal of a unitary, racially integrated system.100 Since the goal of Washington's program was to bring the races
together, not to separate or stigmatize them, the Supreme Court of
Washington found that the use of race in the law school admissions
program was not an invidious classification, and therefore not unconstitutional per se.'01 It concluded that "the Constitution is color conscious in order to prevent the perpetuation of discrimination and to
undo the effects of past segregation." 102 The plaintiff argued that the
use of the school desegregation cases was inapposite in this context
because no benefit was denied in those situations. The court dismissed
his argument, stating that the denial of a benefit is not a per se violation
when the racial classification is compensatory and used to promote
03
integration. 1
As to the appropriate equal protection standard, the court decided
that because racial classifications have traditionally been upheld only
after strict scrutiny, and because a "benign" classification is not
benign with respect to the nonminorities who are adversely affected,
04
anything less than a compelling interest test would be inappropriate.'
Although the compelling interest test usually leads to an automatic
conclusion that the classification is unconstitutional, the court in DeFunis found that the university had demonstrated a compelling state
interest in promoting integration, especially in light of the gross under05
representation of minorities in the legal profession. 1
The underrepresentation of minorities in the university had three
significant effects. First, law students were not adequately prepared to
deal with societal problems resulting from continued isolation of the
races. Second, because of the crucial role the legal profession plays in
the decisionmaking sectors of society, minority concerns go unrepresented (or, at the very least, underrepresented). Third, the shortage of
minority law students not only leads to a shortage of minority attorneys
engaged in private practice-but also leads to fewer black defenders,
prosecutors, judges, and other public officials. 106 "If minorities are to
live within the rule of law, they must enjoy equal representation within
our legal system."' 1 7 Thus, to provide minority representation in
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 25-30, 507 P.2d at 1178-80.
Id. at 27, 507 P.2d at 1179.
Id. at 29, 507 P.2d at 1180.
Id. at 30, 507 P.2d at 1181.
Id. at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182.
Id.at 33, 35, 507 P.2d at 1182, 1184.
Id. at 35, 507 P.2d at 1183-84.
Id.
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professional schools was determined to be a compelling interest which
withstood strict scrutiny. The only viable means available to reach that
end was found to be a program of racial preference. The court also
found that the admissions plan was "the only feasible 'plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now.' "108
The DeFunis case squarely presented the issue of the propriety of
racial distinctions in situations where there had been no deliberate past
discrimination. In other words, the court was asked whether it is a
violation of the fourteenth amendment to remedy de facto segregation
by means of racial preferences. The court found that the de jure/de
facto distinction was not controlling. The state interest in integrating
the legal profession did not become less compelling because the
admission procedures were not implemented to remedy a prior con9
stitutional violation.'0
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the decision of the
Washington court on the grounds that DeFunis' impending graduation
from law school rendered the controversy moot. 1 '0 Justice Douglas, in
his dissent, was the only member of the Court who discussed the
merits of the case. Although seriously questioning the propriety of
reliance upon supposedly objective criteria such as test scores and
grade point averages in determining the qualifications of an applicant,
Justice Douglas reaffirmed the principle that each citizen must be
treated by the government on the basis of his or her individual merit,
and not on the basis of race.111 This principle also requires strict equal
protection scrutiny of racial classifications, but unlike the Washington
court, Justice Douglas found that "any state-sponsored preference to
[sic] one race over another . . . is in my view 'invidious' and
2
violative of the Equal Protection Clause.""1
V.

STANDARDS USED IN SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION CASES

Of the few state and federal cases dealing with preferential admissions programs, Bakke offers the most complete treatment of the
various issues involved. Still, one line of cases largely overlooked in
Bakke may prove helpful in determining the appropriate standard of
review under the fourteenth amendment. In cases involving governmental classification based on gender, the Supreme Court has arrived
108. Id. at 36, 507 P.2d at 1184 (quoting Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
439 (1968)) (emphasis in original).
109. 82 Wash. 2d at 34, 507 P.2d at 1183.
110. 416 U.S. at 319-20.
111. Id. at 337.
112. Id. at 344.
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at a method of equal protection analysis which is articulated as a two113
tiered approach, but clearly employs a middle-level scrutiny.
Moreover, a reading of some of the principal sex discrimination cases
suggests that the Court has varied its equal protection standard depending upon the purpose of the sex-based classification. When the
classifications have been struck down, the courts have used an illdefined intermediate standard. 1 4 When faced with state or federal
legislation that attempts to compensate for past inequities to females,
courts have applied a less strict rational basis test, and have generally
upheld the gender-based classification.1 15 These cases may help the
Court apply a more principled equal protection anaylsis in the Bakke
case.
A.

Unsuccessful Attempts to Employ Sex-Based Classifications

When the United States Supreme Court has struck down genderbased classifications, the rights of the female are usually found to be
inadequately protected. In Reed v. Reed, 116 Frontiero v. Richardson, 117 and Stanton v. Stanton,118 when the competing interests of the
state and the plaintiffs were evaluated, female interests were found to
be impermissibly burdened. In Craig v. Boren,119 it was determined
that the state denied equal protection to males. The Supreme Court,
nevertheless, employed the same equal protection analysis 20 in all
four cases. The Court purported to use the traditional rational basis
standard for non-suspect classifications, but invalidated the government classification even though there was some rational justification in
each case. These holdings, therefore, lend credence to the theory that
there is another standard at work; on the face of the cases the test is
121
rational basis, but the result is that of strict scrutiny.
In Reed,122 a woman challenged her husband's appointment as the
administrator of their son's estate. Although they were equally entitled
113. See text accompanying notes 116-51 infra.
114. See text accompanying notes 116-37 infra.

115. See text accompanying notes 142-51 infra.
116. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

117. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
118. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
119. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
120. The analysis of federal discriminatory action under the due process clause of the

fifth amendment is equivalent to assessing state action under the fourteenth amendment.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Thus, the treatment of the federal case,
Frontiero, was the same as that of the state cases.
121. See generally Comment, The Supreme Court 1974 Term and Sex-Based Classifications: Avoiding a Standard of Review, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 375 (1975); Comment, The
Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE L.J. 163.
122. 404 U.S. 71.
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to appointment, the husband was appointed due to a statutory preference for males. The purpose of the legislation was to avoid "one area
of controversy when two or more persons [are] equally entitled [to be
appointed]. "123 The Court ostensibly employed the rational basis standard, 124 yet it found that the legislation did not further the state's
objective in a "manner consistent with the command of the Equal
Protection Clause.' ' 125 Although the Court recognized the legitimacy
of seeking to reduce the workload of the probate courts,' 26 it nonetheless found the classification to be arbitrary and violative of the four127
teenth amendment.
Two years later in Frontiero,128the Court struck down a legislative
scheme which allowed male Air Force officers simply to declare their
spouses as dependents in order to receive increased living allowances
while female officers could qualify for the same benefits only by
demonstrating the actual dependency of their spouses. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, found sex to be a suspect classification and
applied a strict scrutiny standard. He relied on Reed as an implicit
indication of that determination. In so doing, he explicitly stated that
the Reed decision fully justified a "departure from 'traditional' rational-basis analysis" 129 in light of the past discrimination to which women have been subjected in this country. The three Justices who concurred in the result felt that Reed was controlling and sought to delay
because the federal government asserted that administrative convenience was the justification for the statute-the same justification as was
offered by the state in Reed-Frontiero can be read as bolstering the
Reed decision.
123. Id. at 76.
124. "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' " Id. (quoting F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
125. 404 U.S. at 76.
126. "Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating
one class of contests is not without some legitimacy." Id.

127. Id.
128. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
129. Id. at 684.

130. Id. at 688. Justice Brennan could not differentiate between the immutable
quality of sex and that of race or alienage. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Blackmun concurred in the result, but thought that it was not necessary to determine the
suspect nature of gender-based classifications in order to decide the case; they were
compelled to wait until the fate of the Equal Rights Amendment was known before
making that determination. Id. at 692-93.
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In Stanton,'3 1 a Utah statute provided for male children to receive
parental support payments until the age of twenty-one, yet payment
could be discontinued for female children when they reached the age of
eighteen. The Court discounted the state court's reliance on "old
notions" about the financial need of male and female children, 133 and
found that the state's rationale was insufficient justification for upholding the statute. Although the Court found Reed to be controlling, 134 it
concluded that this legislative scheme would not survive any standard
of review. 135 The Court discerned no rational basis for distinguishing
between the monetary needs of males and females in light of the
expanded role that women now play in American society.
Even though the lower courts in Reed and Frontierodid not speak
in terms of the woman's stereotypical role in society, the Supreme
Court thought that this stereotype was used by the lower courts to
justify what they determined to be the rational basis of the challenged
classifications. In Reed, men were favored over women as administrators presumably because it was assumed that men had more experience in financial matters than women. To hold hearings to permit
administration by the few knowledgeable women was deemed by the
state to be inefficient. It was assumed by the federal government in
Frontiero that male officers in fact supported their wives. To have a
procedure to ascertain the few men who did not actually provide more
than one half of their wives' support was too time-consuming. The
statute invalidated in Stanton was also based on notions of men's
financial responsibility and female dependence, assumptions which the
Court rejected, further reinforcing the Reed mode of analysis.
The Court used the same type of analysis in striking down a
classification that impinged on male interests. A statute allowing
females to drink beer at age eighteen, while males could not drink until
age twenty-one, was set aside in Craig v. Boren. 136 Although the state
in Craig presented statistics correlating a lower drinking age for males
with increased automobile accidents, the Court dismissed this justification because of the "weak congruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent." 1 37 Again, the Court
131. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
132. Id. at 9-10.
133. Id. at 10. Those "old notions" were that men generally are responsible for

providing for a home and thus need more training or education. Also, women are apt to
marry
134.
135.
136.
137.

earlier, and thus do not need support for as long a time.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Id. at 199. The Court did admit, however, that the correlation asserted was not

statistically insignificant. Id. at 201.
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reaffirmed the Reed decision. 13 8 More importantly, the Court ignored
the justification for the statute offered by the state, and required more
than mere rationality. The standard articulated by the Court was that
"classifications by gender must serve some important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of these
39
objectives." 1
When these four decisions are compared to earlier equal protection
cases, it is not difficult to discern that the Court is doing something
differently, although it is articulating its reasoning in familiar language. In McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners,' 40 the
Court formulated the test as follows: "Legislatures are presumed to
have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted
to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and
their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can
14 1
be conceived to justify them.'
Under this standard courts have acted without hesitation to fill gaps
left by legislation that is either inarticulate or incomplete. That clearly
is not the Court's present role with regard to sex-based classifications.
In all the cases above, the Court has found that, despite some rational
connection, the justification was insufficient. The unavoidable explanation for the Court's lack of imagination in ascertaining a "conceivable" justification for sex-based classifications is that the Court is
applying a test more stringent than the "traditional" rational basis test.
B.

Successful Attempts to Employ Gender-Based Classifications

Not all attempts to formulate legislative schemes based on gender
classifications have been invalidated. Despite the fact that the courts
have ostensibly applied the Reed language in a consistent fashion, the
results have been remarkably different. In Kahn v. Shevin,142 the
Florida legislature granted widows a $500 tax exemption, which was
not available to widowers. In upholding the statute, the Court emphasized the state's interest in bestowing a financial benefit upon women
because of their traditionally lower earning capacity and their absence
from the job market. 143 The Court quoted the Reed test as controlling;
the classifications must have some "fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation." 144 The object of the legislation in Kahn was
138. Id. at 204.
139. Id. at 197.

140. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
141. Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
142. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
143. Id. at 354.
144. Id. at 355.
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to reduce the economic disparity between men and women, 145 apparently a more substantial justification than the mere administrative
convenience asserted in Frontiero.146 Although old stereotypes partially explained the state action, the effect of the exemption was not to use
those characterizations to interfere with the flow of equal benefits to
females' 47 but rather as a justification to compensate for the effects of
the stereotypes to the extent they had deprived women of economic
opportunity in the past.
A similar compensatory scheme was seen in Schlesinger v. Ballard.148 A United States Navy procedure resulted in the discharge of
male line officers if they had been passed over twice for promotion
within nine years. The same procedure was followed for women
officers, but the time period was thirteen years. Because not all Navy
positions were open to women, the longer time period was a Congressional attempt to equalize treatment of the sexes. 149 The Court distinguished both Reed and Frontiero because the classifications in those
cases were based on "overly broad generalizations" while in Schlesinger the classification was based on the "demonstrable fact that male
and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with
respect to professional service."' 510 The classifications in Reed and
Frontiero were further distinguished because they were established
only to insure administrative convenience, whereas the purpose of the
Schlesinger classification was to enable the Navy to meet its needs
with highly motivated personnel. 15 ' Thus, as in Kahn, the Court
allowed a gender-based classification which attempted to rectify perceived inequalities resulting from traditional, and presumably archaic,
notions of male and female roles.
C.

Limitations of the Sex-Based Analogy

The primary feature that sets Kahn and Schlesinger apart from
Reed and its progeny is the compensatory quality of the legislation.
The different result in the latter cases, where sex-based classifications
were used to perpetuate traditional male-female notions, highlights the
145. Id. at 352.

146. Id. at 355.
147. This was the case in Reed, Frontiero and Stanton.
148. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
149. Id. at 508. The Court looked to the fact that women were not assigned to duty in
combat aircraft or on most vessels. Id. The Court further noted that when men and
women are treated similarly by service regulations no gender distinctions are made in
regard to tenure. Id. at 509.
150. Id. at 507-08.
151.

Id. at 510.
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Court's willingness to allow remedial measures. The cases all purport
to use the same equal protection standard. Yet, one would then anticipate, especially in light of early articulations of the rational basis
standard, as in McDonald, that the results would have been the same.
All of the legislation had, at the very least, a conceivable justification.
Yet the results were not identical. The Court is apparently willing to
use a lower standard of review, perhaps the traditional rational basis
standard, when the purpose of the statute is to compensate a class, such
as women, who have been deprived of equal treatment because of
1 52
pervasive discriminatory attitudes within society. 153
The question then becomes whether the Court would be willing to
apply this framework in the racial discrimination context. Will the
Court, when faced with remedial state action, use a lower standard of
review? Presumably, since race is a suspect classification and racial
classifications are usually subject to strict scrutiny, the Court would
use some intermediate standard. Perhaps the standard proposed in
Alevy 54 -a substantial state interest and the least onerous alternative-would be the proper standard.
In drawing an analogy based upon an analysis of Kahn and
Schlesinger, it must be noted that the compensation given there has a
different effect than that given in Bakke. Although the state in the two
former cases is bestowing a benefit on one class and not on the other, it
is not denying an opportunity to one class in order to grant a benefit to
the other. It is the loss of opportunity which Allan Bakke is fightingthe opportunity to attend medical school. It can also be argued that
Kahn and Schlesinger represent a "but for" situation: but for
economic deprivations in the past, the financial position of women
would probably be nearer that of men and they would not be in need of
financial aid or preferential treatment. A similar argument could be
applied in the Bakke situation: but for discrimination by whites against
minorities, minorities would not be in need of any preferential treatment.15 5 However, one drawback to this theory is that completely
152. In Kahn, the state's tax exemption was not granted to compensate for any
particulardiscrimination against women, but rather to remedy general societal institutional discrimination which brought about a disparity of earning power between the
sexes. 416 U.S. at 353-55. It is this institutional discrimination which the Bakke majority
would not permit the university to remedy by means of a classification based on race.
153. Or perhaps the Court in Kahn and Schlesinger recognized that the state's
compensatory purpose was more than rational-meeting some middle-level justification
sufficient to sustain sex-based classifications.
154. 39 N.Y.2d at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
155. This theory has been articulated as the rightful place doctrine in the Title VII
context. However, in Title VII cases it is usually used to benefit individuals who
suffered discrimination, and is generally applied against employers who were found to
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innocent parties are affected by an institution's magnanimous offer to
rectify past societal wrongs. A person like Bakke is affected even
though he did not act to the detriment of any minority student.
For these reasons the Court may be reluctant to analogize from the
gender classification cases and to lower the standard of review in the
preferential admissions context. However, the fact that sex is at least a
"quasi-suspect" class makes the analogy more legitimate.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD

The original understanding of the fourteenth amendment as embodied in its literal terms was that the state should not confer benefits
on the basis of such arbitrary criteria as race and national origin. Thus,
even "benign" classifications "lie in obvious tension to the Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 156 The decisions of the few courts which have
dealt with the issue of preferential admissions reflect this attitude.
Although most courts have applied the strict scrutiny test, the results
have not been uniform. 157 One can only conclude that there is no
consensus, and that the question before the Supreme Court in Bakke is
still open.
Many commentators agree that the use of benign racial classifications should not be subjected to a test of per se invalidity or to the
rational basis test. 158 The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
invalidate racial classifications, but has declined to do so. 159 Thus, the
Court has at least provided for racial classifications to be sustained
when they have either a neutral or a beneficial effect, 160 and has
preserved a measure of flexibility in evaluating racial classifications.
The conclusion that the equal protection clause literally requires "colorblindness" is not, therefore, mandated by the decisions of the Court
to date.
have discriminated against minorities. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976); Chance v. Board of Exam., 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976); Acha v. Beame,

531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1975); Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
156. Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1975).
157. Compare DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated
as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) with Bakke.
158. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 156, at 560; O'Neil, Racial Preference and
Higher Education:The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REv. 925,933-40(1974). See generally
Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An
Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 343 (1974).
159. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
160. See, e.g., Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (racial classification upheld
because it was used for purely statistical reasons).
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The rational basis test is criticized as soundly as the strict scrutiny
test because it provides too much flexibility. Even the dissent in Bakke
recognized that racial classifications require more than minimum
scrutiny. 161 Professor O'Neil has remarked, "[r]acial distinctions are
immutable and indelible, and should therefore not be reinforced by
governmental classifications to any greater degree than is absolutely
necessary." 16 2 He is also skeptical about whether the rational basis test
would provide adequate safeguards to ensure that racial classifications
are limited in time and scope. 163 Moreover, when the Court applies this
less strict standard, it "entertain[s] a presumption of constitutionality
and place[s] the burden on the challenging party to show that the law
64
has no reasonable basis."'
Strict scrutiny has been advocated as the best alternative. Otherwise, the Court must determine whether the classification is benign,
which would involve the Court in the perilous search for motive. Thus,
it is argued, the most constitutionally sound course is to judge both
invidious and benign discrimination by the same standard. 165 Contrary
to the conclusion reached in Bakke, however, numerous commentators
and a majority of the Washington Supreme Court in DeFunis find that
66
compelling state interests justify preferential admissions programs.'
There are several arguments against imposing a strict standard of
review. The first is that the effect of strict review would be contrary to
the history and purpose of the fourteenth amendment. The intent of the
framers of that amendment was to forbid, in the express terms of the
nation's fundamental social compact, the continuation of a segregated
society. As the Court said in McLaughlin v. Florida, "the central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment [is] to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States."' 67 If benign
racial classifications were subjected to strict review, however, they
would often fall, either because no compelling interest was established, or because a judge will always be able to divine a less burdensome means, as the majority did in Bakke. Thus, a literal interpretation of the amendment invokes a standard of review which frustrates
the intention of the amendment.
161. 18 Cal. 3d at 81, 553 P.22 at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
162. O'Neil, supra note 158, at 933.
163. Id. The New York court in Alevy also stressed the need for time limits in the
application of "benign" classifications. 39 N.Y.2d at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 90.
164. Developments, supra note 51, at 1087 (footnotes omitted).
165. O'Neil, After DeFunis: Filling the Constitutional Vacuum, 27 U. FLA. L. REV.
315, 326 (1976).
166. Id. at 329-41.
167. 379 U.S. at 191-92.

PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS

The second objection to strict scrutiny is that a classification is not
invidious unless it stigmatizes a class of persons. Since no stigma
would attach to whites deprived of a place in school, the classifications
cannot be considered invidious. 1 68 Third, because whites do not meet
the traditional indicia of a suspect class, 169 strict review would be
inappropriate. The characteristic of "political powerlessness" is particularly relevant here. 170 Whites are the dominant political force in
this country. On the other hand, it is argued that the white majority is
not a "monolith" and some whites should not be able to speak, and
act, and give up rights for all whites. 171 Professor Brest responds:
"Though reasonable people may differ, I doubt that 'reverse discrimination' is likely to become so pervasive at any occupational level in
our white-dominated society as to cause cumulative harms or frustrations approaching the magnitude of those inflicted by . . . malign
discrimination.' 7 2 Another commentator, Professor Samford, suggests that discrimination against whites should not be considered
"racial" discrimination because it does not "purposefully" disadvantage a racial minority. 173 "Purposeful" means no decision would be
made "but for" its differential impact upon racial minorities. Thus,
since minorities admitted under special programs are not admitted
solely because of the unfavorable impact upon whites, the classifications of preferential admission programs are not suspect. Consequently, no strict scrutiny is warranted.' 74
A final reason to eschew the strict scrutiny standard is that if racial
preference programs were found to meet the high standard of compelling interest, this might dilute the meaning of compelling interest, as
168. See Redish, supra note 158, at 362-63.
169. That is, white males are not "discrete and insular minorities" within the meaning

of Justice Stone's famous footnote four-the source of strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
170. "[T]he class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
171.

See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 180 (1977)

(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
172. Brest, Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 17 (1976).
173. Samford, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Racial Discrimination, 25 EMORY L.J. 509, 574 (1976).
174. Id. at 577. This "but for" definition of discrimination would also, however,
preclude a finding urged by amici curiae below, that the reliance upon test scores was
"institutional" discrimination, 18 Cal. 3d at 59, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697,
for the institution could not be said to rely on the test scores solely because of the
disproportionate racial impact.
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that term is presently understood. As a constitutional safeguard, it
might be preferable to differentiate between invidious and benign
classifications, and to subject invidious classifications to a strict test.
Thus, invidious classifications still would be constitutionally valid
1 75
only in extraordinary situations.
The cases dealing with preferential admissions offer two alternative methods of analysis-either the middle-level "substantial State
interest" analysis suggested by the Alevy court, 7 6 or the strict scrutiny
test used by both the Bakke 7 7 and DeFunis courts. 178 If the Supreme
Court in Bakke employs a middle-tier analysis, it must respond to the
argument which a majority of the Bakke court found ultimately persuasive; that is, if the fourteenth amendment protects the right of an
individual to equal protection, then Allan Bakke should receive the
179
same protection from the Court as a member of any other race.
Rather than responding to this argument with mere assertions of
"irony" and "anomaly" as the Bakke 180 dissent and the Alevy majority, 181 the Court can make use of the analogy to sex-based discrimination cases where state classifications are permitted to remedy the
effects of past societal discrimination.' 8 2 Where the state justifies its
actions in this manner in the sex discrimination cases, the Court lowers
its middle-level scrutiny to a rational basis standard. Thus, in the
reverse discrimination cases the Court could similarly lower its standard from strict scrutiny to a "substantial State interest" test where the
state seeks to remedy de facto racial discrimination.
If the Court employs a strict scrutiny test and nonetheless reverses
the decision below because the classification survives that scrutiny,
then its chief concern must be to define adequately the increasingly
obscure notion of compelling interest. Compelling interest is seldom
defined in judicial opinions, with the result that courts upholding such
interests tend to do so in rather summary fashion. Hopefully the
Supreme Court can clarify this point in a well-reasoned and deliberate decision; more is needed than a simple statement that the
175. The Court has only upheld invidious classifications twice, both times within the
context of a world war. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
176. 39 N.Y.2d at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
177. 18 Cal. 3d at 50-51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
178. 82 Wash. 2d at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182.
179. 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
180. Id. at 66, 553 P.2d at 1174, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
181. 39 N.Y.2d at 334-35, 348 N.E.2d at 544-45, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
182. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
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state's goal is "undeniably" compelling.' 83 If equal protection can be
viewed from the perspective of a societal majority imposing its will
upon a dissenting minority, a "compelling" interest should be more
than an interest strongly favored by the majority-the concept first
developed to describe an imperative measure necessary to national
survival in time of war.184 If that element of danger or national survival
is not essential to a compelling interest, the Court should define the
term so that future determinations are not based solely upon an individual judge's perception of what is socially desirable.
DOROTHY W. SCHOCH
183. 82 Wash. 2d at 35, 507 P.2d at 1184.
184. See Koremastsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

